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The slogan that advertised the flagship policy of the Conservative Party in the 2010 general 
election read ‘Big Society not Big Government’(Conservative Party, 2010a). Prime Minister 
Cameron (2011a) has asserted that the Big Society is his ‘absolute passion ... it is a different 
way of governing, a different way of trying to change our country for the better’. The 
different way of governing is, as per the Conservative Party’s slogan, not through big 
government. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (2010a), in an effort to assure us of the value 
of Cameron’s big idea, goes further and equates ‘Big Society’ with ‘liberalism’, and 
simultaneously, ‘empowerment’ with ‘responsibility’. The latter is key to the Big Society 
idea: Cameron claims to empower, that is to make us responsible as individuals, communities 
and, ultimately, as a population, so that we might become actively involved in community 
control and self-management. The Big Society aims to be a ‘big advance for people power’ 
(Cameron, 2010d) that will mend our currently ‘broken’ society (Cameron, 2009b).  
 
This article argues that presenting the Big Society as a departure from big government is 
inaccurate and problematic. The aim of the article is to show that the Big Society in fact is 
big government, where we understand government as governmentality. That is, we argue that 
the Big Society is part of a modern form of managing the conduct of individuals and 
communities such that government, far from being removed or reduced, is bettered. To 
illustrate this, we look at two major Big Society initiatives and examine how they ultimately 
work to produce bigger, better, more efficient government: these are, first, the National 
Citizen Service (NCS) and second, the Community Resilience programme. The NCS refers to 
a nationwide initiative to recruit teenagers for a summer of activities in the hope of producing 
‘socially responsible’ young people who can serve their community and get on with people 
from different backgrounds (Cameron, 2009b). The Community Resilience programme 
attaches itself to existing attempts to help communities better manage themselves in the face 
of emergencies and threats to their security, such as floods and terrorist attacks. In both 
examples, we examine how individual and group identities are regulated such that 
membership of (the big) society becomes conditional on certain forms of behaviour – and this 
regulation of behaviour is in fact big government(ality).1 Furthermore, the move to 
recognising the Big Society as governmentality is important because it reveals the way forms 
of management and control are being presented as precisely their opposite: freedom and 
                                                 
1 We interpret ‘government’ (as used in the phrase ‘big society as not big government’) in the Foucualdian sense 
to be always, already governmentality – that is, a power relation of governing conduct – hence the use of 
government(ality). 
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empowerment. Most current critiques of the Big Society are limited since they largely focus 
on the issue of veiled spending cuts. While we agree that the Big Society has acted as a mask 
for austerity measures, there is more to say. Moreover, to stop here would imply that 
increased or unchanged spending would make the Big Society benign. We thus focus on the 
‘more’, arguing that regardless of spending cuts, the Big Society is disingenuous because it 
is, contrary to Cameron’s marketing of it, about more control and the increased management 
of the behaviour of communities and individuals – i.e. bigger and better government. 
 
Our reading of governmentality draws on the work of Michel Foucault and as such describes 
both a process and a methodology. As a process, governmentality challenges traditional 
understandings of ‘government’: 
 
“Government” did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; 
rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be 
directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick … To 
govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of action of others (Foucault, 
2002, p. 341 – emphasis added). 
 
Drawing on the centrality of ‘conduct’, Colin Gordon (1991, p. 2) has famously and 
succinctly described governmentality as ‘the conduct of conduct’ – that is, a form of activity 
or practice that aims to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons. It is 
essentially focused on tactics and techniques – the activities or processes of governing. As a 
methodology, governmentality refers to a way of thinking about the practice of government: 
‘who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 3). It is a 
‘govern/mentality’ (Barron, 2005, p. 984). It is thus a useful and creative tool for 
understanding the practices and processes of the Big Society. However, as a first step we 
must look at the way in which the Big Society has been outlined in its own terms. 
 
 
THE BIG SOCIETY 
 
No idea has caused quite as much derision or suspicion in recent years of British politics as 
Cameron’s ‘Big Society’. Indeed, the government minister Tim Loughton publicly admitted 
in 2010 that ‘most people’ do not know what the phrase means, ‘let alone the unfortunate 
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ministers who have to articulate it’ (quoted in Stratton, 2010). The academic community has 
been equally baffled (see Smith, 2010, p. 829), sometimes opting for the dismissal of the 
concept as both ‘anaemic rhetoric’ and an ‘inverted form’ of recycled Thatcherism (See Kerr, 
Byrne and Foster, 2011, pp. 196 and 198). This section will try to make sense of the Big 
Society by reconstructing it from the broad outline offered throughout Cameron’s speeches 
and Conservative policy documents. We focus on Cameron’s speeches because he has so 
heavily associated himself with the concept as his ‘great passion’ (Cameron, 2010d) and 
‘guiding philosophy’ (Cameron, 2010a). Meanwhile, members of his government have not 
always been so supportive. His coalition partner and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg 
(2010b, p. 1), has claimed Big Society is just another name for Liberalism. More importantly, 
the Chancellor George Osborne (e.g. 2009a, 2009b and 2010) has – while repeating many of 
its themes such as social responsibility, the localisation of power, the brokenness of society, 
and the importance of the voluntary sector – resolutely avoided using the term ‘Big Society’. 
Nonetheless, in 2012 Cameron continues to promote the idea (2012a) and launch new 
initiatives, such as Big Society Capital (2012b).2 
 
While the exact phrase was first used in November 2009, Cameron was largely accurate to 
claim in 2010 that the argument behind the ‘Big Society’ has ‘informed my whole time as 
Conservative leader’.3 The need for a stronger, more responsible society is founded on a 
diagnosis of Britain’s problems based in the work of Iain Duncan Smith’s Centre for Social 
Justice and its Social Justice Policy Group (see especially its Breakdown Britain report, 
2006). This is used to back up the frequently repeated claim that Britain is a ‘broken society’ 
– thus the ‘long term mission’ of the Conservative government is to ‘repair’ (Cameron, 2008) 
or ‘mend’ our broken society (Cameron, 2009a; see also 2009b; 2010a; 2011a). In a key 
speech on the theme, Cameron offers some symptoms of this brokenness: 
 
So I think it is time to be honest about what has been happening to our country. There 
has always been violence. There has always been evil. But there is something about 
the frequency of these crimes – the depravity of these crimes, that betrays a deep and 
fundamental problem in Britain today. As I have argued for many years now, these 
                                                 
2 It is true, however, that Cameron is referring to the Big Society much less frequently in 2012. A keynote 
speech on welfare in June (2012c) saw no mention, focusing instead on a ‘responsible society’. It is unclear at 
the time of writing whether this is a temporary lull before one of the flagship policies periodic re-launches. 
3 For example, the ‘pro-social society’ in 2005 (Cameron, 2005; see also Cameron, 2007a), the‘opportunity 
society’ in 2006 (2006b) and the ‘revolution in responsibility’ (2007a). 
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acts of murder and abuse are just the most violent and horrific expressions of what I 
have called the broken society.... Something is broken. Society is broken. (Cameron, 
2010b) 
 
Along with youth murders, more prosaic evidence of this breakdown is also noted, from hoax 
calls and physical threats to the fire service, the abuse of disabled people on the streets, drug 
addiction and suicide to the ‘grim grind of hopelessness’ experienced by the long-term 
unemployed. Unsurprisingly perhaps, after the urban riots across the UK in August 2011, 
Cameron (2011d) signalled that such criminality was a ‘wake-up call for our country’ and its 
‘broken society’. 
 
The prescription for repairing this situation is the ‘big society’. As the Conservative 
manifesto for the 2010 election put it ‘Our society is broken, but together we can mend it: we 
can build the Big Society’ (Conservative Party, 2010b, p. 35). And what Cameron (2011a) 
calls the ‘key’ to the Big Society, ‘the one word at the heart of all this’ is responsibility. The 
cause of the breakdown in society identified throughout Cameron’s leadership is the need for 
more ‘social responsibility’ (Cameron, 2006b). Social responsibility is defined as ‘the 
attitude, decisions and daily actions of every single person and every single organisation in 
society... the good society is a responsible society... What builds society, what encourages 
civility, is people taking responsibility. Putting each other before themselves’ (Cameron, 
2007a). As we explain below, both the NCS and the Community Resilience programme aim 
to enable and build this social responsibility for one’s own conduct and that of one’s 
community. 
 
But why has social responsibility lapsed? The key analytical move made by Cameron’s 
Conservatives (and that upon which their policy agenda relies entirely) has been to blame the 
crisis and breakdown on too much state involvement in the life of communities, i.e. ‘big 
government’. This produces the deceptively simple dichotomy of big government and big 
society – with one being the source of everything identified as bad; the other as the source of 
everything good. Labour are thus accused of wanting to solve society’s ills through more 
government and not seeing that ‘[i]t is more government that got us into this mess’ (Cameron, 
2009a) because ‘big government has helped atomise our society’ (Cameron, 2009b). The 
claim is that people have come to rely upon government and have begun to turn to 
government first for a solution to social problems, rather than their families, neighbourhoods 
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and communities – i.e. society. Such ‘big government’ has led to a ‘steady erosion of 
responsibility’ (Cameron, 2009a).  
 
The paradox at the heart of big government is that by taking power and responsibility 
away from the individual, it has only served to individuate them. What is seen in 
principle as an act of social solidarity, has in practice led to the greatest atomisation of 
our society. The once natural bonds that existed between people – of duty and 
responsibility – have been replaced with the synthetic bonds of the state – regulation 
and bureaucracy (Cameron, 2009b). 
 
The fundamental notion behind the Big Society then is to foster greater social responsibility 
in individuals, families, neighbourhoods, communities and, ultimately, the nation by making 
‘a big advance for people power’ (Cameron, 2010d). The social responsibility that is called 
for ranges across four basic types identified in the 2010 election manifesto (Conservative 
Party, 2010b, p. vii), and elsewhere (Cameron 2006b; 2008; Conservative Party, 2010a, p. 1) 
as: personal, professional, civic and corporate responsibility. We are being asked to take more 
responsibility for our own family and friends, our own industry and workplace, our own 
community and neighbourhood, and for our employees and environment. Cameron (2007a) 
invokes John F. Kennedy in claiming that ‘the big question is not what will government do, 
but what will society do?’ 
 
This foundational dichotomy of state vs. society and its affect on responsibility allows 
Cameron’s Conservatives to hold on to Thatcher’s legacy of opposing and rolling back the 
state, while tweaking it through their use of society in direct opposition.4 This gives us 
perhaps the most frequently used, if slightly awkward, aphorism of Cameron’s leadership: the 
claim that ‘there is such a thing as society – it’s just not the same thing as the state’ 
(Cameron, 2005; see also 2006b; 2007a; 2009a; Conservative Party, 2006, p. 1; 2010b, p. 
vii). Cameron has managed to build on the broad cross-party support which elected him as 
leader (see Heppell and Hill, 2009), keeping Thatcherites onside while blending elements of 
Willetts civic conservatism (Evans, 2010, pp. 331-2) with key insights from the right-wing 
leaderships of William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith (Blond, 2010, p. 32; Beech, 2009, pp. 
                                                 
4 As one reviewer interestingly suggests, Cameron is also reappropriating and depoliticizing the notion of ‘social 
solidarity’, delegitimizing class solidarity and producing it as a way of coping with neoliberalism, rather than 
challenging it. 
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28-9) and almost reproducing the Conservative One Nation group’s recommendations from 
1959 (see Seawright, 2010, pp. 168-9 regarding their document entitled The Responsible 
Society). Meanwhile, the undeniable influence of New Labour’s Third Way (McAnulla, 
2010) has been silently folded into this brand of ‘progressive’ Conservatism. Cameron’s Big 
Society has been presented less as a ‘Red Tory’ (Blond, 2010) idea, and more as a necessary 
development of Thatcherism based firmly in the opposition of state vs. society. The aim is 
thus not just rolling back the state, ‘but rolling forward society’ (Cameron, 2007a).  
 
The problem, of course, is that the state/society dichotomy does not work, and for two 
reasons: firstly, Cameron (2009b; 2010a) himself acknowledges that ‘rolling forward society’ 
requires state involvement – someone/something has to do the rolling. Secondly, as this 
article argues, because the changes that the Big Society intends to bring about do not imply 
less government but more management of people’s conduct as individuals and a population, 
through communities, neighbourhoods and indeed self-government. Under the vision of a Big 
Society we are not to be less governed, but more efficiently and effectively so, by governing 
our own conduct and that of those around us in our families, neighbourhoods and workplaces.  
 
While the latter problem will be the focus of most of the article, it is also important to outline 
the former. Despite the importance of the dichotomy to his policy framework, Cameron 
(2009b) acknowledges that ending big government does not produce a big society: ‘it doesn’t 
follow that smaller government would automatically bring us together again... we must use 
the state to remake society’. Clearly government and society can be on the same side and not 
antagonists. Despite the rhetoric then, the issue is to produce a ‘new role’ for the state, a 
‘thoughtful reimagination’ of its job (Cameron, 2009b). Cameron opposes this ‘new role’ to 
that of Labour’s ‘mechanistic view of the state – that it could and should command and 
control’. So the issue is not one of size at all, but one of function and method, the way 
government ‘works’ which should not be ‘top-down, top-heavy, controlling’ (Cameron, 
2010d). The state he claims should not try to ‘control’ society ‘directly through initiative, 
regulation and law’ (2007a). Rather, it must be about producing the right conditions 
(Cameron, 2005), ‘creating a framework of incentives that encourages people and 
organisations to behave responsibly’ (2007a). While Labour conceived the relationship 
between society and state as ‘top-down, adult-to-child’, Cameron (2009b) wants it to be one 
of adult to adult. So the state’s role is reconceived as that of ‘empowering and enabling 
individuals, families and communities to take control of their lives... Galvanising, catalysing, 
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prompting, encouraging and agitating for community engagement and social renewal’ 
(Cameron, 2009b; 2010a). Ironically, this is all language previously used by Labour’s 
Stakeholder Society and Third Way. These earlier incarnations of a governmentality 
approach (see Rose, 2000) did not, however, involve public spending cuts; quite the reverse. 5 
Thus, this ‘new’ role for the state does not even imply less government – it has no necessary 
implications for quantity or size. Thus, the rhetoric of ‘Big Society Not Big Government’ 
both feeds from what it seeks to criticise in Labour’s Third Way and fails to make sense on 
its own terms.  
 
The new role for the state does, however, involve an increased number and range of actors. 
We argue that by engaging more and multifarious networks of actors – from social 
entrepreneurs to community activists and, ultimately, the population (Cameron, 2010d) – 
what is proposed in the Big Society is far from being a matter of less government, but rather 
better, more efficient and effective management of people’s behaviour and values. What is 
ultimately at stake here is perhaps the formation of ideally resilient, responsible citizens 
whose greater depoliticized productivity will help drive the country out of recession while 
mitigating structural defects of the UK economy. Nevertheless, the Big Society is not about 
reducing government but rolling forward governmentality.6 While Kerr, Byrne and Foster 
(2011: 201) have noted that ‘arguably, shades of governmentality are reflected overtly in 
Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ rhetoric’, they offer modest evidence and their tentative conclusion 
does little to demonstrate how thoroughgoing this governmentality agenda is, how deep it 
runs, or how wide-ranging its implications could be.  
 
 
GOVERNING INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES 
 
                                                 
5 A thorough comparison of the similarities between the Big Society and Labour’s approach, especially 
regarding the ‘enabling’ role of the state, the stress on social responsibility and the role of the voluntary sector 
could begin with Blair 1996a; 1996b; Bevir 2000; Temple 2000. Sadly, it is beyond the scope of our current 
article. 
6 Foucault’s understanding of ‘power relations’ evolved from power as discipline to power as government (what 
he calls ‘governmentality’ and which involves and maintains the disciplinary relation) – an interesting 
intermediate step in this development was ‘biopower’, that is a new technology of power over population: ‘a set 
of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human subject became an object of political 
strategy’ (Foucault, 2007: 1). We favour the use of a ‘governmentality perspective’ as a means of understanding 
how groups of individuals, communities and populations are controlled over using the concept of ‘biopower’ as 
it is the questions of ‘how to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 88) – i.e. the strategies and practices of governing – I that we are interested in over and above 
questions of how the regulation of the population happens using the biological fact that it is a species. 
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The Big Society agenda has led to a range of policies, from parents running schools, 
communities operating local amenities and charities providing welfare services (see 
Cameron, 2009b) to setting up the four ‘vanguard’ areas of Liverpool, Eden in Cumbria, 
Sutton in London and Windsor and Maidenhead in Berkshire.7 Others include the Big Society 
Bank (Conservative Party, 2010a, pp. 2-4), National Centres for Community Organisation 
(Conservative Party, 2010a, p. 6), Social Enterprize Zones (Cameron, 2007b) and the 
Community First Scheme (Cameron, 2011b). However, it would be difficult for a list to be 
exhaustive because the Big Society concept runs throughout the government’s policy agenda 
(Conservative Party, 2010a, p. 1; Cameron, 2010a). In the next two sections we will look at 
two policies that have emerged out of the Big Society agenda. These have been selected 
because while one is the long planned and much heralded flagship of the Big Society (the 
NCS), the other  has opportunistically tacked the idea on to an existing approach to UK 
emergency planning (the Community Resilience programme). We outline the strategies and 
techniques of management and control that are used in these policies – i.e. the types of power 
relations they involve.  
 
The National Citizen Service (NCS): A Military Regime? 
Cameron chose to play on the ‘National Service’, a compulsory military service required by 
some governments, when labelling one of the flagship policies of the Big Society, the 
National Citizen Service (NCS). The ‘NCS experience’ 
(http://nationalcitizenservice.direct.gov.uk/) refers to a summer programme of outdoor 
activities set both at and away from home which teenagers, aged 15-16, can voluntarily take 
part in on completion of their GCSE’s.8 2011 was the first of two pilot years – there were 
11,000 spaces available that year, which has been be extended to 30,000 in 2012 and will be 
further extended to 90,000 by 2014.9 The National Service analogy is clearly intended to 
convey a sense of duty, service and ‘common purpose’ (guardian.co.uk, 2010), with the PM 
stating ‘when you talk to people who did National Service, a lot of them say the thing was we 
did it together’ (2011a – emphasis added). We argue that the NCS does indeed illustrate that 
we are in ‘it’ together – by showing that we are in government together: that is, we are 
governing ourselves, better, together. The goal of the NCS is to ‘help to build a more 
                                                 
7 Liverpool famously later withdrew from the vanguard programme because of government spending cuts that 
made its vanguard status unsustainable. 
8 Further information on the NCS, including ‘NCS details’ and ‘NCS Stories’, is now available at 
http://nationalcitizenservice.direct.gov.uk/ (accessed 30 July 2012). 
9 Statistics obtained from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/major-expansion-national-citizen-service-16-
year-olds (accessed 30 July 2012). 
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cohesive, responsible and engaged society ... [through a] programme of activity and service’ 
(Cabinet Office [CO], 2011e, p. 5 – emphasis added). Cameron (2009b) claims that it will 
produce ‘socially responsible young people who can serve their community and get on with 
people from different backgrounds’. We argue that as well as perhaps producing ‘socially 
responsible’ young people, the NCS represents a series of governmental tactics that will 
produce better, more productive and communally-orientated citizens, even the ‘ideal citizen’. 
This happens through more and better government, or governmentality, which operates via 
tactics that discipline and regulate behaviour, controlling through values such as 
responsibility and a sense of service.  
 
Over seven to eight weeks, NCS participants go through five distinct phases of activity, 
which begin by introducing participants to their teams and mentors, involve spending time 
away from home/the local community and performing (typically outdoor) challenging 
activities such as rock climbing or kayaking. It ends with the participants designing a ‘social 
action project’, having approached and consulted groups and individuals in the local 
community.10 The weeks follow a rigorous, almost military, timetable nationwide though 
they do vary in nature according to the type of organisation the provider is. There are 
currently twelve lead providers for the 2011 pilots, which were determined following a 
competitive selection process. The providers are based in the nine areas throughout 
England,11 and include, for example: Catch 22 (offering 1, 515 places), Football League 
(Community) Ltd (800 places), The Challenge Network (3, 240 places) and The Prince’s 
Trust (825 places).12 Some providers make a fairly comprehensive outline of the timetable of 
activities available on their websites, such as The Football League13 and The Field Studies 
Council which has set up an intensive environmental-themed NCS programme called Eco 
Challenge Xtra.14  
 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed outline of the five phases see Cabinet Office, 2011e,  p. 5. 
11 The nine areas are: Greater London, South East England, South West England, East of England, East 
Midlands, North East England, North West England, Yorkshire and Humberside, and West Midlands. A pilot 
scheme in Northern Ireland is being commissioned for the autumn of 2012 for 250 participants (see 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/national-citizen-service-northern-ireland, accessed 30 July 2012). 
12 The full list of providers is as follows: Bolton Lads and Girls Club, Catch 22, Connexions Cumbria Ltd, Field 
Studies Council, Football League (Community) Ltd, Lincolnshire and Rutland Education Business Partnership, 
Norwich City Community Sports Foundation, Safe in Tees Valley, The Challenge Network, The Prince’s trust, v 
– The National Young Volunteers’ Service, Young Devon and South West Consortium.  
13 http://www.football-league.co.uk/fltrustnews/20110215/trust-selected-for-national-citizen-
service_2293640_2294342 (accessed 29 June 2011). 
14 http://www.eco-challenge-xtra.org/young-people/what%E2%80%99s-really-involved.aspx (accessed 29 June 
2011). 
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The Challenge Network is one of a handful of providers that we contacted directly for more 
information on their schedule of activities and were able to offer greater detail on their NCS 
programme. Challenge bid for certain towns in London, the West Midlands and the North 
West of England. They visited every school in the area, approaching the head teachers in the 
first instance, attending Year 11 assemblies and following this up with workshops in an effort 
to recruit youngsters. During the first week of the programme, participants are divided into 
teams of twelve plus two mentors, who are expert staff. They undertake outdoor activities 
and, in their groups, the participants discuss how these apply to themselves, to their teams, 
and finally to their communities. ‘It is very important that they make the link between the 
activity and the learning’, explains Challenge’s Chief Executive, Craig Morley.15 In week 
two, as the teams are introduced to their local community, they must each choose an interest 
area, such as media, photography, drama or sport. They spend the morning being trained in 
that skill and in the afternoon they are taken to a local community group and may conduct a 
dialogue with that group, such as adults with severe learning disabilities. If interested in 
photography, the youngsters may take photographs of each other and talk about their life 
stories. The aim is to weave young people into the community (Morley interview: 2011)– to 
ensure they interact with people they would not normally interact with, such as the disabled, 
old people and the very young. Week three is about an explicit focus on the community. The 
youngsters are tasked with a project of their choice that will help their community (previous 
examples include road safety, underage drinking, and renovating local parks). To gather 
ideas, the participants may go door to door or stop people in shopping centres. The idea is 
pitched to a ‘Dragon’s Den style panel’ who offer up to £200 to fund the project. Over the 
weeks of September, the participants put this project into action. By early October, there is a 
celebratory graduation ceremony, which typically takes place at a high profile venue and 
Challenge’s Chief Executive explains that ‘at that point, critically, we invite people to join 
The Challenge Society’.  
 
The NCS programme of activities in each case illustrates a disciplinary formula used to 
manage the behaviour of individuals. Similar to Foucault’s analysis of the construction of the 
body of the prisoner or the soldier in Discipline and Punish, the teenager becomes the object 
of certain practices that are directed at producing a body that can be made politically useful. 
                                                 
15 Unless otherwise stated, all information on The Challenge Network taken from phone interview with Craig 
Morley, Chief Executive, The Challenge Network, 7 June 2011. Details available from http://www.the-
challenge.org/about-us/people/founders/ (accessed 6 June 2011). 
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Through a strictly regulated timetable of activities, the body of the teenager is thus 
‘subjected, used, transformed and improved’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 136). The activities, from 
the physical activities to team-building sessions and discussions with mentors, are meticulous 
and minor techniques which together create a formula for controlling individuals. In this 
sense, the NCS reformulates the disciplinary framework of the army or the prison (see 
Foucault, 1991), without the necessity of spatial enclosure. The body of the teenager is then 
labelled as the ‘ideal citizen’ – one that is politically useful because it has been conditioned 
and regulated into a productive (because it will want to go out and work), communally-
orientated (the work will be giving something back to the community) body. 
 
This reworked disciplinary relation involves a strong element of pastoral power. Pastoral 
power, as explained by Foucault, refers to the ‘power of care’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 127) – it 
resembles the relation of a shepherd towards his flock, encompassing responsibility and 
beneficience. Moreover, it is both an individualising and collectivising power, at once 
concerned with each sheep of the flock and the flock as a whole. The teenager in the NCS 
model is surrounded by a range of experts that represent the pastorate: teachers, programme 
leaders, mentors, etc who guide and inform their behaviour. They ‘keep watch’ over the 
‘flock’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 127). The experts are characterised as such by virtue of possessing 
‘expert knowledge’ (Kennedy, 2005, pp. 17-8), which resembles a shared disciplinary 
sensibility and qualification. An excellent example of pastoral power is The Challenge 
Network’s ‘reflection sessions’. The evenings during week one involve 90 minute sessions 
where the mentor facilitates discussion on how to link the activities of the day to the general 
NCS/Big Society programme, i.e. character building. Morley identifies three common 
character traits that mentors focus on throughout the programme, calling these ‘the thread’ 
that runs through the whole 8-week programme: trust, responsibility and understanding. 
These three characteristics, which of course echo values intrinsic to the Big Society, are 
presented as values which should determine the behaviour of young people whilst on the 
NCS programme, and furthermore as values which they ought to aspire to once they have left 
and gone back to life in their communities.  
 
The NCS thus concerns itself with the ‘conduct of conduct’; that is, a concern with regulating 
the behaviour (conduct) of individuals (each teenager) and groups of individuals (all 
teenagers). Cameron himself has spoken of the aim of bettering government by controlling 
the behaviour of individuals claiming that the latest academic research has shown how 
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government, ‘by going with the grain of human nature, can better influence behaviour’ 
(2009b – emphasis added). Managing behaviour shows government to be bettered, not 
lessened as Cameron claims – for it spreads the power relation throughout, and becomes 
more deeply ingrained within, the lowest levels of actors within the social body. Nikolas 
Rose (2000, p. 1399) has termed this a ‘new politics of conduct’ which functions via 
‘ethopolitics’ – a type of  power relation that ‘works through the values, beliefs, and 
sentiments thought to underpin the techniques of responsible self-government and the 
management of one’s obligation to others’ (see also Rose, 2007). It is simply a different style 
of governing the conduct of teenagers – and one that is intended to continue into a ‘post-
NCS’ phase (CO, 2011e, p. 5), forming them into productive, well behaved, efficient (and 
docile) adult citizens. 
 
Moreover, this new style of governing does not require a governor per se: the individual is at 
once the governor and the governed, regulating her own behaviour. Governmentality 
necessarily involves self–government. The pastoral relation helps illustrate how experts 
govern individuals in the NCS model but also how those young people will become experts 
in their own right – or ‘lay experts’ (Rose, 2007, p. 128) – and thereby become involved in 
their own government through the values prescribed to them by the Big Society (see also 
Author, 2011b). These are responsibility, trust and understanding according to one of the 
NCS providers, and responsibility, liberalism, freedom and empowerment according to 
Cameron (2010d). There is strong evocation of a ‘sense of duty’. Young people become lay 
experts as they gain knowledge about the NCS, participate in its programmes and assume 
responsibility for their role in governing. The NCS website’s ‘Stories’ section attests to this: 
as one participant so succinctly comments ‘I think the programme will help me pursue my 
dreams of becoming a TV presenter and journalist and give something back to the 
community’.16 
 
To expand, knowledge about the Big Society is gained by the young people initially through 
the pastoral relation with those that are considered experts in volunteer programmes, 
leadership activities, schooling, etc. But young people can also educate themselves and each 
other: they can access the NCS online via facebook, they can access documentation on the 
Big Society online and participate in the many and various Big Society online chat fora (such 
                                                 
16 Ayesha Taylor-Camara, 16 from Woodford Green, http://nationalcitizenservice.direct.gov.uk/ (accessed 30 
July 2012). 
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as ‘The Big Society Network’17). Facebook is a good example of the self-educating, self-
governing processes: the activity of searching, reading, writing, replying to and posting 
messages are all forms of technologies of the self – that is, techniques by which these young 
people govern themselves through prescribed modes of conduct. They will of course become 
educated through their participation in the NCS activities and volunteer programmes 
themselves. They are educating themselves and each other on how they ought to manage their 
behaviour within a prescribed framework of activity. As young people acquire knowledge 
and participate in the NCS processes, they will become responsible actors: it is key that this 
responsibility is assumed – it need not be conscious. The knowledgeable, active and 
responsible teenager is an ‘ideal citizen’: one that self-governs according to prescribed norms 
and values (see also Vaughan: 2000).  
 
The NCS thus incorporates governmental strategies (a timetable of activities, a code of 
conduct) that discipline and manage behaviour, producing and normalising certain 
problematic identities: the (pastoral) ‘expert’ and the ‘ideal citizen’ (or lay expert).  The 
creation of the ‘ideal citizen’ is troubling because it creates a third, oppositional category 
against which the ideal citizen can be readily recognised: the ‘delinquent citizen’, or ‘thug’. 
This identity attaches itself even to those who do not take part in, or are not selected for, the 
NCS. The Government hopes that the NCS ‘will become a valid part of public life and be 
open to every 16 year old’ (CO, 2011e, p. 21) but there will inevitably be those who cannot 
or do not want to take part.18 This marginalises what we are calling the ‘delinquent’ category. 
The ‘delinquent’ is a politically useful category since it creates ‘delinquency’ – an abnormal, 
undesirable and illegal form of behaviour which the safe, virtuous, ideal society should guard 
against (Foucault, 1991, pp. 265-8). Delinquency characterises Cameron’s ‘broken society’ – 
as the riots of August 2011 showed – and creates an unnatural, dangerous category of 
existence against which the PM was able to present his NCS programme as a necessity and an 
‘answer’ (see Cameron, 2011d). The NCS thus at once produces the ‘delinquent’ and 
                                                 
17 http://www.thebigsociety.co.uk/ accessed 29 June 2011. 
18 There is a concern not to allow the financial situation of young people to hinder participation – costs vary 
according to provider, for example the Football League puts the cost of the programme as between £50-100 
(http://www.football-league.co.uk/fltrustnews/20110215/trust-selected-for-national-citizen-
service_2293640_2294342 accessed 29 June 2011); Eco-Challenge Xtra states the cost is £45 (http://www.eco-
challenge-xtra.org/young-people/what%E2%80%99s-really-involved.aspx (accessed 29 June 2011) and The 
Challenge Network asks for £35 (Morley). Nonetheless, there are obviously not enough places to go around and 
while Morley stresses that Challenge has no set criteria, they do aim for a ‘religious, ethnic and gender mix’, 
measuring that mix ‘on a weekly basis’. Others, such as Catch 22 appear to ask questions to gauge the level of 
the applicant’s interest (http://www.catch-22.org.uk/NCS-register-your-interest accessed 29 June 2011). Note 
the ‘Equality Duty’ which binds all providers as per the Equality Act 2010 (see further CO, 2011e, p. 8). 
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‘delinquency’, labels it as undesirable, and yet relies on its constant production in order to 
manage young people. The delinquent is both the inevitable failure of governmentality to 
manage conduct and a necessary part of that management – evidence that it cannot fail. It is 
governmentality in action: a reflexive form of government based on regulating behaviour 
according to values we are told we ought to aspire to in order to prevent a broken, delinquent 
society that can lead to violence, insecurity and a lack of care for the community. This is 
certainly not the opposite of big government – it is, rather, better, more diffuse government 
where individualss govern themselves and their communities.   
 
Community Resilience: Regulation Through Emergency 
The second example of the Big Society ‘in action’ that we examine here is the Community 
Resilience programme, the third phase of which was rolled out by the Cabinet Office in 
March 2011. As noted, in contrast to the flagship NCS, Community Resilience developed 
previous emergency planning techniques in the UK. The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act made 
it a statutory requirement for all key public services to build ‘resilience’ into their local 
governance infrastructure (Coaffee and Rogers, 2008, p. 104). Rather than reactive, this was 
part of an attempt to be proactive and pre-empt potential terrorist attacks and general 
‘emergencies’. Being ‘prepared’ for emergencies was seen as central to the ability of 
communities to ‘bounce back’ from disasters, itself a definition of resilience (Maguire and 
Hagan, 207: 16-17). While predominantly urban in nature and driven by central government, 
the notion of resilience demanded local government take the lead in response to crises, 
‘enabled by a far higher level of involvement from a multitude of stakeholders and business 
interests’ (Coaffee, 2009, p. 263). It is therefore clear how the Big Society would map on to 
this agenda, with an emphasis on local experts, community actors, groups and businesses 
taking responsibility for their own security through resilience planning. The ‘Strategic 
National Framework on Community Resilience’ notes that the ‘programme is part of the 
Government’s “Big Society” commitment to reduce the barriers which prevent people from 
being able to help themselves and to become more resilient to shocks’ (CO, 2011a, p. 3). 
 
The Coalition Government’s notion of community resilience went further, however, in 
extending this to rural, and indeed all communities. This was enacted primarily through the 
March 2011 Strategic Framework (CO, 2011a) already mentioned, as well as a range of other 
instructive documents produced with and for communities such as the ‘Preparing for 
Emergencies: Guide for communities’ (CO, 2011b) and the ‘Community Emergency 
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Planning Toolkit’ (CO, 2011c). The ostensible aim of the programme is not conventional 
government, but to help existing communities to ‘adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level 
of function, structure and identity’ (CO, 2011a, p. 4; from Edwards, 2009). Unlike the Civil 
Contingencies requirements, the Framework makes clear that this is ‘not a mandated 
statement of expectations’ but a ‘proposed way forward’ (CO, 2011a, p.5). Like all Big 
Society programmes, it is about ‘motivating and incentivising participation’ (CO, 2011a, p. 
6), seeking not to ‘dictate’ but to ‘support and enable’ (2011a, p. 7). It is therefore a set of 
guidance which ‘invite[s]’ pre-existing communities to help themselves better survive and 
adapt in emergencies against all threats and hazards, such as floods and pandemics (CO, 
2011a, p. 9).  
 
This creates an emphasis on knowing the community – i.e. producing (labelling) individuals 
and groups of individuals so that they can be disciplined and managed. ‘Community’, much 
like ‘delinquency’, creates a category that can be confined, known, controlled and 
reproduced. It is clearly stated that the ‘Community Resilience Programme is a long-term 
programme leading to cultural and behavioural change across the country’ (CO, 2011a, p. 
15). Furthermore, the programme works to subdivide the community into different group and 
individual identities, placing them hierarchically in relation to each other such that they can 
be better managed, and, crucially, better manage themselves. As such, its aim is similar to 
Foucault’s critique of the ‘enclosure’ of groups of individuals in barracks (soldiers), in 
schools (children) and in prisons (vagabonds), but without the spatial restriction: ‘Its aim was 
to... know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications... to be able 
at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to 
calculate its qualities and merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering 
and using’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 143).   
 
The programme thus produces the resilience ‘champions’, ‘experts’, ‘volunteers’, ‘resilient 
individuals’ and finally, the ‘vulnerable’. In a section identifying the key features of a 
resilient community, the Framework identifies the need for a ‘champion’, whose role is to 
communicate the ‘benefits of community resilience to the wider community’ (CO, 2011a, p. 
15). The Guide for communities prefers the term ‘community representative’, whose function 
is to ensure that an emergency plan is created and coordinates the work of others towards that 
goal (CO, 2011b, p. 10). These individuals are therefore tasked with organisational roles, but 
also with disseminating the values and virtues of community resilience as they should be a 
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trusted figure, who uses ‘their energy and enthusiasm to motivate and encourage others to get 
involved and stay involved’ (CO, 2011a, p. 15). They are charged with governing the ethos of 
community and its resilience. 
  
In a semi-detached role, we also have the role of disaster management ‘experts’ and 
‘responders’, such as the fire service, paramedics and flood protection specialists from the 
Environment Agency. They appear to be in, but not necessarily of, the community, and take a 
different role to the pastoral experts we saw in the NCS. They should ‘work in partnership’ 
with community resilience groups, offering ‘encouragement’ and advice on ‘the biggest and 
most relevant risks’, but are clearly separate and ‘do not have a duty to facilitate or support 
community activity’ (CO, 2011a, p. 14-5). Thus they are kept at a distance as part of official 
governmental emergency control. Indeed, in the Cabinet Office’s definition of community 
resilience it is spoken of as the community acting to protect itself ‘in a way that complements 
the response of the emergency services’ (CO website – emphasis added).  
 
A more central identity, created and guided by the champions and experts, is the ‘volunteer’. 
A key commitment of the Big Society is for every adult in the country to become a member 
of an ‘active neighbourhood group’ (Conservative Party, 2010a, p. 1; 2010b, 37-8), and the 
resilience programme enables this. The voluntary, rather than coerced, nature of such 
participation is stressed (CO, 2011a, p. 14), and the Toolkit notes that ‘Volunteering is often 
spontaneous by nature’ as people automatically help each other in times of need (CO, 2011c, 
p. 7). However, while avoiding compulsion, the Big Society’s emphasis on social norms 
necessitates a degree of peer pressure. It is therefore suggested that ‘as part of your planning, 
you could speak to individuals and groups in your community and ask them if they would be 
willing to volunteer in an emergency’ (CO, 2011c, p. 7). Though a light-touch form of 
behaviour management, more persuasion than coercion, being ‘spoken to’ by a group of 
community activists is nevertheless an exercise of power. And communities are directed 
towards advice on better ‘managing groups of volunteers’ by the Toolkit (CO, 2011c, p. 7). 
 
Champions and volunteers then come to form the idealised ‘resilient individual’ (CO, 2011a, 
p. 15), those who the Framework refers to as ‘having an informed understanding of the risks 
faced’, the impacts of those risks, an ability to ‘assess their proximity and vulnerability to 
those risks’, and the ‘motivation to act and be prepared’ (CO, 2011a, p. 11). Resilient 
individuals share with the ‘ideal citizen’ produced by the NCS the norms and values of social 
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responsibility. The silent and never mentioned Other to this resilient individual is of course 
the ‘reluctant’ or ‘recalcitrant individual’, who fails to internalise the social norms of 
community and resilience. And like the delinquent, the recalcitrant individual demonstrates 
the failure and, conversely therefore, the success of the community governmentality through 
resilience. But the final identity created is that of the ‘vulnerable’.  The Toolkit advises that 
the community should make sure it is aware of this group, those in the community who ‘may 
be vulnerable in a crisis’ (CO, 2011c, p. 4). Special provision is suggested for people who 
have recently had an operation, those without transport, with limited mobility and those who 
might find it difficult to understand emergency information (CO, 2011c, p. 6). These are 
subjects without the capability to cope, and therefore require the help of truly resilient 
individuals, rather than the recalcitrant individual who, like the ‘delinquent’ in the NCS 
model, remains unmentioned. 
 
But how can such vulnerable individuals be helped? Each group should be kept track of, 
documented and listed with the Community Emergency Plan. The ‘Template’ of such a plan 
offered by the Cabinet Office (see 2011d) even contains a section (p. 9) for keeping track of 
organisations to help the vulnerable. Thus another governmental tactic is the collection and 
dissemination of information and knowledge about the entire community – part of the first 
‘step’ towards community resilience (see CO, 2011c, p. 4). This information and data, despite 
appearing as ‘mundane tools – surveys, reports, statistical methodologies, pamphlets, 
manuals... statistics, and so forth’ (Inda, 2006, p. 6) are important not only because they make 
possible a knowledge of the community but also because they thereby make the communities 
visible, shaping them into forms that are calculable and able to be regulated (see further 
Author, 2011a). Forming the Community Emergency Plan, which involves identifying your 
community as well as its vulnerabilities, and then planning for how it will respond, cope and 
bounce back from tragic events, is about knowing one’s community such that it can be better 
managed, controlled and directed even without an emergency actually occurring. This is 
furthered by the advice that communities should ‘practice activating the plan to test how well 
it would work’ and allowing the identification of ‘any problems’ with it (CO, 2011c, p. 12).  
 
Drills and rehearsing one’s plan then is a matter of disciplining a community to become more 
perfect, and thus more perfectly resilient. Segregating certain identities, promoting 
volunteerism, and collecting information and data on labelled groups (i.e. ‘communities’) 
within a population are techniques of spreading social norms, changing and directing its 
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behaviour at a micro and macro-level. What is at stake in the formation of resilient 
communities and the exclusion of the recalcitrant is the maintenance and perpetuation of 
docility and efficient economic productivity that the NCS aims to produce, even after a 
disaster. Thus the resilience programme accepts the inevitability of emergencies but simply 
aims to ‘adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity’ (CO 
2011a, 4).  This does not involve ‘big’ conventional government but, like the rest of the Big 
Society, it involves strategies used for governing behaviour and dispersing a mentality of 
government, control and management throughout the social body. It is not about less or 
smaller government, but more efficient, effective and productive governing of selves, others 
and populations (as communities). 
 
 
CONCLUSION: GOVERNING BEHAVIOUR 
 
We have argued in this article that at the heart of the Big Society is the fostering of greater 
social responsibility in individuals, families, neighbourhoods, communities and, ultimately, 
the nation as a whole. The government’s role is to create the environment where this is 
possible, but offer less by way of direct provision themselves. However, when we see 
government as a series of tactics for managing conduct, as a mentality, we can see this 
attempt to spread responsibility as one of disseminating and diffusing the exercise of power 
as government. It ‘multipl[ies] the agencies of government’ but also wrap them ‘within new 
forms of control’ (Osborne and Rose, 1999, p. 751). The new agencies created by the 
responsibilization of this governmentality are many and various, as we have seen in our case 
studies – from the experts of the NCS and the resilience ‘Champions’ to, crucially, teenagers 
and volunteers themselves. 
 
The Big Society puts a major stress on individuals as agents, taking control of managing their 
own behaviour. Thus the 2010 Conservative Party (2010b) election manifesto was entitled: 
‘Invitation to Join the Government of Britain’. We are told to govern ourselves as well as 
others (2010b, p. 37). This is described as a form of empowerment, giving people ‘the 
opportunity to take power’ (Cameron, 2010a), a driving down of power to the level of the 
individual (Cameron, 2010d; 2010e). But this is not a conventional definition of power; it is 
not an ability to make others do what they would not otherwise choose. Rather, it is power 
defined as responsibility, a responsibility ‘to do the right thing – by themselves and each 
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other’ (Cameron, 2011b). This is what the influential Philip Blond (2010, p. 35) advocates as 
a ‘politics of virtue’. People may have been given greater agency as ‘power and control’ of 
themselves and their communities (Cameron, 2011a), but it is a heavily circumscribed form 
of agency: the power to cope with neoliberalism rather than challenge it; the power to do 
what is right, rather than what one wants. And unsurprisingly, it is part of the ‘enabling’ and 
‘galvanising’ role of government to define what is right. This is government(ality) by values, 
or what Rose terms ethopower. The power ‘we’ are being given through the Big Society, 
then, does not include ‘community activism’ such as the rioting and looting seen in the UK’s 
cities in August 2011, which Cameron described as ‘sickening’ (2011c). These activists are 
the essential ‘delinquents’ and ‘recalcitrants’. They are not the active, responsible, ‘ideal’ 
subjects of self-government: the teenagers who spend their summer at the NCS, the perfectly 
resilient individuals, and further the parents who set up their own schools, the locals who run 
their own pub or post office, social entrepreneurs and charity workers (Cameron, 2009b). 
 
However, this government by values extends far beyond the individual by seeking to socialise 
and change the behaviour of the population as a whole. Cameron notes that the strategies and 
techniques of governmentality will be aimed at three groups: the social entrepreneurs, the 
community activists and ‘the population’ itself (Cameron, 2009b). As he puts it, the ‘big 
society demands mass engagement: a broad culture of responsibility, mutuality and 
obligation’ (2009b; see also 2010a). The aim is for government to ‘better influence social 
behaviour’ by changing ‘social norms’; with the ‘right prompting, or “nudge”, government 
can effect a whole culture change’ (Cameron, 2009b). Two specific social norms that are 
named are those of giving to charity and volunteering (Cameron, 2011b), but the culture 
change aimed at is obviously broader and includes all ‘virtuous’ behaviour. The explicit aim 
of the Big Society is thus to ‘change social behaviour’, to manage it better by encouraging the 
population to ‘behave responsibly’ (Cameron, 2007a). To what end is not always clear, but 
we have suggested behaviour change is oriented to producing (NCS) and maintaining  
(Community Resilience) more productive, communally-oriented, efficient, self-managing, 
depoliticized (and docile) individuals and groups. 
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, this attempt to change behaviour follows the same line as the Third 
Way, which 6, Fletcher-Morgan and Leyland (2011, pp. 427-8) have identified as the 
distinctive project of New Labour. But like the Third Way, produced in a growing economy 
and funded by greater public spending, this is not about less or smaller government, but more 
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effective forms of government. In fact, this could be seen as an ‘ideal’ form of government, 
as Cameron (2010b) himself labels it, because ‘it needn’t even involve the government doing 
anything’ overtly (2009b) – individuals govern themselves through norms and values that 
they are led to aspire to. Cameron is therefore right to assert that the Big Society is ‘not a cuts 
agenda’ (2011b). It has nothing to do with less government and is not necessaryily linked to 
austerity but tries, rather, to diffuse the mentality of governing throughout society so we all 
govern ourselves and others around us more responsibly and virtuously. It is part of a more 
thoroughgoing liberalism in the double sense Foucault identified: a government informed by 
principles of political economy, but also ‘a government which economizes on its own costs: a 
greater effort of technique aimed at accomplishing more through a lesser exertion of force 
and authority’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 24). The liberal techniques of government produced by the 
Big Society – and demonstrated through the NCS and Community Resilience programme – 
are thus smuggling in more government, greater social control, under a guise of 
empowerment, freedom and less government. 
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